



## Governance Alerts (Short-Form Analysis)

### Alert 23-11

#### Lessons from Federal Receivership: The Signs of Institutional Negligence

**Category: Fiduciary Governance | Audience: Boards, Audit Committees, CFOs, General Counsel, Internal Audit, and Risk Leaders**

*Purpose: To alert directors and senior managers that institutional failure is usually visible before it is fatal, if the board is looking at the right signals.*

#### **Board-Level Alert**

Federal receivership is not simply a post-failure administrative process. It is an institutional autopsy. When the FDIC steps in as receiver, the work quickly turns to asset preservation, liability reconciliation, claims administration, contract review, and the pursuit of recoveries from directors, officers, professionals, or other parties whose conduct caused loss.<sup>1,2,9</sup> For non-bank boards, the lesson is direct: the same breakdowns that appear in bank failures - weak risk governance, stale corrective actions, liquidity blindness, concentration risk, poor data integrity, and ceremonial oversight - are also warning signs in operating companies before lender intervention, litigation, regulatory enforcement, covenant default, or insolvency.

#### **Why This Alert Matters**

A receiver usually arrives after the board has lost the privilege of internal correction. By that point, the institution no longer controls the narrative, the timeline, the document review, or the legal theory used to explain what happened. In a federal receivership, the record is reconstructed by outsiders who ask practical questions: What assets exist? What liabilities are enforceable? Which books can be relied upon? Which controls failed? Who knew what, and when?<sup>1,2,9</sup>

The 2023-2024 bank failure record sharpened an older lesson. Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, First Republic Bank, and Republic First Bank differed in business model, size, and supervisory history, but public postmortems repeatedly identified failures of risk management, liquidity discipline, governance responsiveness, concentration management, and corrective-action follow-through.<sup>4-8</sup> Those themes are not limited to banking. They are the same institutional conditions that precede distressed sales, creditor control, fraud investigations, restatements, enforcement actions, and board-level liability in non-bank enterprises.

## **Defining Institutional Negligence**

Institutional negligence is not the same as a bad forecast, a failed strategy, or an ordinary business loss. It is the sustained organizational failure to recognize, escalate, and correct known or knowable risk signals. The legal vocabulary may differ across contexts - breach of fiduciary duty, failure of oversight, unsafe or unsound practice, inadequate internal control, disclosure failure, gross negligence, or professional liability - but the operational pattern is similar. The institution received signals, converted them into documentation, and then failed to convert documentation into discipline.

The board does not need to manage every operational detail. It does need to ensure that a reporting and escalation architecture exists, that material exceptions reach the right level, and that repeated exceptions produce visible consequences. Delaware oversight doctrine, including Caremark and *Stone v Ritter*, is often summarized around the duty to implement information systems and not consciously ignore red flags.<sup>10,11</sup> Federal receivership adds a harsher practical lens: after failure, investigators evaluate whether red flags were merely reported or actually governed.

## **Seven Warning Signs Boards Should Treat as Fiduciary Signals**

Governance has become ceremonial. Board packets are lengthy but not diagnostic. Directors receive dashboards but not variance explanations, risk tolerance breaches, aging schedules, or evidence of remediation. Minutes show presentations, but not probing questions, dissent, or follow-up accountability.

Growth has outrun control capacity. Rapid expansion, new locations, new products, acquisitions, or new customer segments can overwhelm accounting, compliance, liquidity forecasting, cybersecurity, vendor oversight, and legal review. SVB and Signature Bank postmortems both underscore the danger of growth without matching risk-management maturity.<sup>4-6</sup>

Concentration risk is rationalized as strategy. A company may be profitable because it is concentrated in one customer, lender, product, geography, revenue stream, supplier, platform, funding source, asset class, or executive relationship. The fiduciary issue is not concentration alone; it is concentration without limits, stress testing, exit options, and contingency planning.<sup>4-8</sup>

Liquidity is described rather than proven. Earnings, EBITDA, backlog, receivables, or asset value may create comfort while cash availability is deteriorating. Federal receivership experience repeatedly shows that the decisive question is not whether assets exist in an accounting sense; it is whether they can be converted, pledged, collected, or preserved when pressure accelerates.<sup>1,3,7</sup>

Open findings are aging. Audit points, regulatory comments, lender concerns, quality defects, whistleblower allegations, legal holds, tax notices, covenant issues, and insurance exclusions are carried forward quarter after quarter. A stale finding is not evidence of transparency; it is evidence that the institution knows what has not been fixed.

The three lines of assurance have blurred. Management owns risk; compliance and risk functions monitor; internal audit provides independent assurance to the board. When those roles collapse into management self-certification, the board loses its independent view of whether governance and controls actually operate.<sup>12</sup>

The accounting record cannot support legal reality. Receivership work often exposes gaps between the ledger and enforceable rights: undocumented side agreements, weak collateral files, unsupported reserves, unreconciled intercompany balances, stale valuations, missing approvals, or systems that do not agree. Public-company rules similarly treat disclosure controls and internal control over financial reporting as management-supervised processes designed to record, process, summarize, report, and communicate required information.<sup>13</sup>

### **The Fiduciary Architecture Response**

Boards should treat institutional negligence as a preventable architecture failure. COSO frames internal control around control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring.<sup>14</sup> PCAOB risk-assessment standards likewise emphasize understanding the company and its environment, identifying risks of material misstatement, and inquiring of the audit committee, management, and others.<sup>15</sup> Translated into board practice, the issue is whether governance information is structured to reveal risk early enough to act.

#### **Immediate Board Question**

If a receiver, lender workout officer, regulator, plaintiff lawyer, or forensic accountant entered the company tomorrow, what would they review first - and would those records prove discipline or expose institutional neglect?

### **A 30-Day Board Review Protocol**

Request a one-page concentration map covering customers, revenue, debt, suppliers, software platforms, banking relationships, revenue recognition assumptions, key executives, and legal exposures.

Require an aging schedule of all open audit findings, control deficiencies, regulatory comments, litigation issues, tax notices, lender concerns, insurance exceptions, and whistleblower matters.

Test cash truth: compare bank availability, borrowing capacity, covenant headroom, restricted cash, collection risk, payment holds, and near-term obligations under a 13-week liquidity view.

Ask management to identify the five numbers in the board packet that would be hardest to prove within 48 hours.

Require legal, finance, compliance, and internal audit to jointly identify areas where the accounting record, contract record, and operational reality do not align.

Review whether board minutes show actual oversight: questions asked, alternatives considered, risks escalated, dissent preserved, and owners assigned.

Convert stale findings into deadlines, named owners, budgeted remediation plans, and board-level escalation triggers.

### **Questions Directors Should Ask Management**

Which risks have appeared in the board materials for more than two quarters without measurable remediation?

Where are we relying on a person rather than a process?

Which covenants, licenses, customer contracts, tax positions, or regulatory obligations could become immediately material under stress?

What assumptions would fail first if revenue dropped, credit tightened, rates moved, a major customer paused, or a key system went down?

Have internal audit, outside counsel, external auditors, regulators, lenders, or insurers raised issues that management considers immaterial but outsiders may not?

### **Practical Takeaway**


Federal receivership teaches that institutional negligence is usually cumulative. It forms when exception reporting becomes routine, governance becomes performative, concentrations become normalized, and corrective action becomes optional. The board should not wait for a crisis to ask receivership-style questions. Those questions are most valuable before failure, when fiduciary oversight can still convert warning signs into disciplined action.

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